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Abstract: Economic growth causes growing urbanization, extension of tourist sector, infrastructure and 
change of natural landscape. These processes of land use change attract even more attention if they take place 
in coastal zone area. In that case not only the efficient allocation and preservation of natural area, but also 
reduction of potential damage from flooding is important. Driven forces of land use at macro and micro 
levels should be taken into account. This paper presents an agent based model (ABM), which is designed to 
simulate land use change in coastal zone area based of human behaviour. The aim is to understand motives, 
types of connections and interactions between different actors and natural environment in order to get a 
feeling how different policy options and natural conditions might affect land use configuration. 
Microeconomic motives of land use decisions are in the focus of the research. Individual land use decisions 
are guided by economic and geomorphologic conditions, spatial planning and coastal protection policy. Each 
location choice is done according to a set of defined rules and land attributes. Space is represented as a grid 
of cells. Self-interested economic agents interact with each other trying to benefit from a certain type of land-
use. We introduce the perception of risk of flooding in the model of land use as an innovative aspect of ABM 
simulations for water management problems. Based on decisions of spatially distributed individual economic 
agents operating in a policy framework, the model produces aggregated land-use patterns as an outcome. 
Understanding the factors that affect land use decisions will help policy makers design incentives to achieve 
policy objectives in coastal zone area. The proposed ABM will be applied to a study area in the province of 
North Holland in the Netherlands. 




Land use change is a result of interactions 
between economic and natural systems, which are 
characterized by nonlinearity, cross-scale 
interactions and emergent properties. Tourism 
development, urban development, commercial 
infrastructure, agriculture and natural area compete 
for a limited space. The continued economic 
growth and increase of population cause expansion 
of urban area, which constrains space available for 
other functions. Growing urbanization negatively 
impacts the flexibility of an area, leaving less room 
for adjustments. In coastal zone area (CZA) the 
issue of space allocation is even more essential 
because of the potential risk of damage from flood 
and erosion. Control of land use configuration here 
is especially important in order not only to 
preserve natural areas but also to reduce the 
damage. In the Netherlands a quarter of its surface 
area is below sea level. For different part of the 
coast Dutch coastal zone management policy 
(CZMP) defines probability of flood ranging from 
once in every 1250 years to once in every 10000 
years. It depends on the morphological conditions 
(availability and spatial distribution of sand) and 
on the economic value of protected territory. These 
factors imply that CZMP and spatial planning 
policy (SPP) in the Netherlands are strictly defined 
and regulated at macro-level. However, in spite of 
tough planning the real world land use decisions, 
which are done by individuals, may facilitate 
undesirable spatial developments. In the report of 
Rijkswaterstaat [2005] part of urban and rural area 
of the Netherlands is beyond the legally protected 
line and increasing urban area constrains future 
efforts to reinforce the sea defences. Risk, defined 
as a probability of event multiplied by damage, is 
the main instrument and criteria, which leads 
CZMP and should provide safe and efficient land 
use configuration. At the same time the question of 
risk communication, perception and ways to 
influence it by policy instruments is still open (see 
Balfoort et al. [2002]). In order to predict land use 
developments in the context of different scenarios 
of CZMP and avoid negative consequences a 
better understanding of motives individual spatial 
behaviour is needed. We propose a model, which 
simulates the emergence of land use patterns, as a 
result of micro decisions. 
Several simulation models of land use change 
(Veldkamp and Fresco [1996], Engelen et al. 
[2003]) and management of coastal zone areas (De 
Kok et al. [2001]) were elaborated. These models 
are comprehensive in many aspects and help 
understand the ecological nature of the processes, 
but do not monitor microeconomic forces of land 
use change (such as human behaviour and 
interactions). The well developed research on 
spatially-explicit micro-economic modelling is 
presented by Bell and Irwin [2002]. Some of 
foundations proposed there helped us to elaborate 
our model, but their model does not intend to take 
into account special conditions of CZA, which are 
essential in our case. There is a number of spatially 
explicit agent-based models available (Barreteau et 
al. [2004], Grelot et al. [2005]), but they mainly 
simulate river basin management processes.  
What are the drivers of land use change in the 
level of individual economic agents? To what 
internal motives is the outcome of land use 
decision most sensitive? How land use patterns 
emerge out of many individual decisions? How do 
stakeholders percept risk and how risk issue can be 
communicated? How policy regulations can 
influence the decision-making process? In order to 
answer these questions it is important to include 
micro-level human component in the spatial land 
use simulation. ABM (Gilbert and Troitzsch 
[2005]) was chosen as a method of spatially 
explicit microeconomic modelling of land use 
change. ABM gives a wide range of possibilities 
for land use modelling (Parker et al. [2002]) as 
well as for emergence of aggregated patterns from 
economic behaviour (Tesfatsion [2006]) which we 
emphasize. ABM in particular brings in the 
economic actor into the development and analysis 
of spatial scenarios (Bousquet and Le Page [2004; 
Ligtenberg et al. [2004]). 
The focus of the ABM model, which we 
propose, is to simulate process of land use 
decisions and emergence of patterns in coastal 
zone area taking into account the real situation in 
the Netherlands. The individual land use decisions 
and policy framework we model are empirically 
grounded in processes occurring in the Dutch 
province of North Holland. The real world data 
based on statistical information, data from 
governmental agencies and surveys will be used 
for validation.  
2. CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
In order to understand driving forces of 
individual land use decisions and further 
development of urban area in CZA we apply 
bottom-up approach. Individual agents try to 
optimise their wellbeing (maximise profit and 
utility) within the rules defined by a certain policy 
framework. Behaviour of economic agents is 
determined by internal characteristics such as 
goals and behavioural rules (profit maximisation, 
flood risk perception). External factors are the 
boundary conditions defined in the level of a 
country or a province by policy makers. They 
include CZMP, SPP and economic policy. 
Many individual land use decisions distributed 
across space provide new patterns of land use as an 
aggregated outcome. Different patterns in land-use 
result in different social and economic outcomes. 
They define what will be the value added 
produced, the level of unemployment, as well as 
negative effects on the ecosystem. The damage, 
which might be caused by flood or erosion, 
depends on the spatial distribution of land use 
activities. Usually it is comparatively high for the 
urban area (partly because monetary damage to 
environment is not easy to calculate and quite 
often it is underestimated). Risk of natural hazard 
is defined as probability of hazard multiplied by 
the expected loss in the area endangered (Balfoort 
et al. [2002]). 
As a result of land-use change some areas along 
the coast may require more protection because of 
their high economic value. The risk of natural 
hazard is used as one of the indicators for 
optimization of decision-making in Dutch CZMP 
nowadays. It may cause changes in the coastal 
protection, spatial planning and economic policy in 
the macro-level. New policy regulations influence 
both internal and external factors of individual 
behaviour, which give rise to a new circle over the 
scheme.  
The model defines two types of actors: “land 
user” (LU) and “governmental authority” (GA). 
The model mimics agents who define new location 
or change the type of activity taking into 
consideration risk of flooding. Allocation decision 
is based on the individual goals and types of 
behaviour of various actors. Many spatially 
disaggregated decisions of various agents form the 
new land use configuration and consequently new 
potential damage to the territory under risk of 
flooding. We suppose that each location choice is 
done according to: 
o goal of an agent; 
o set of defined behavioural rules;  
o land attributes and environmental 
conditions;  
o outcome which agent gets from the 
decision 
LU agents can implement several types of 
activities, such as agriculture, tourism or urban 
area. GA agent is interested in maintaining 
economic activity on its territory (to have 
investments from land users). However to reach 
this goal he should implement flood defences (with 
a certain probability of flood) and provide options 
for insurance from flooding which will be of 
interest for LU agents. LU agents express their 
demand in space in coastal zone area and want to 
have a certain level of safety of their investments. 
Both types of actors have the common goal to 
sustain such level of risk of flooding, which is 
acceptable by all involved actors. According to the 
land use configuration at the end of each period the 
damage from flooding can be defined as well as 
the amount of insurance, which should be paid by 
one of the parties.  
Agents take information from the spatial 
environment. Based on the goal, information from 
the environment and behaviour rules agents make 
decisions concerning land use type or policy 
regulation, which are implemented in the spatial 
environment. GA and LU agents are also 
interacting with each other and are directly 
involved in shaping the land use. Figure 1 presents 
a conceptual framework for simulation of 
emergence of land use patterns by means of agent-
based modelling.  
Space is represented as a grid of cells (parcels). 
It is the scarce good in coastal zone area. So, a cell 
under a certain land use type cannot be used for 
anything else over a particular time period.  
Time step of the model simulation is one year. 
Each time step LU agents analyse the situation in 
the spatial and regulatory environment. Depending 
on their budget, past experience, level of risk 
perception and real possible risk, insurance scheme 
and spatial plans of GA agent LU agents invest in 
a certain cell.  
Figure 1: Conceptual framework of agent-based 
model of land use 
Simulation includes several scenarios of CZMP 
(position of the safety line, strengths of 
dunes/dykes in terms of probability of flood), 
optional schemes of insurance from flooding and 
level of individual risk perception. The data about 
policy options is taken from the Dutch policy 
regulations (Balfoort et al. [2002]; Rijkswaterstaat 
[2005]). Data about individual risk perception will 
be extracted from a survey by Terpstra and 
Gutteling [2006]. Real world data about the 
situation in the Netherlands will be used to 
perform sensitivity analysis. A map of land use 
patterns in the study area of the coastal zone with 
information about potential damage is supposed to 
be an outcome of the simulations. 
3. AGENT DESCRIPTION 
3.1 “Land User” Agent 
In the process of simulation self-interested 
economic agents interact with each other trying to 
benefit from a certain type of land-use. Three types 
of land use activities are assumed: agriculture, 
tourism and urban area. Actually, LU agents 
represent main stakeholders in coastal zone area. 
The location choices of LU agents are based on a 
set of rules and land attributes as in the research by 
Parker et al. [2002; Bousquet and Le Page [2004] 
and are driven by profit maximisation as described 
by Fujita and Thisse [2002]. In addition to that the 
decision strategies of land users are elaborated 
during the discussions with specialists from 
National Institute for Coastal and Marine 
Management. Besides, we are planning role-playing 
games where participants represent main 
stakeholders. It will clarify the formalism used for 
the behaviour rules. 
 LU agents decide what activity to implement on 
a particular spatial cell that they own or to which 
location to move if it maximises their expected 
returns in spite of concomitant costs. Each type of 
land use (tourism, agriculture and urban) has its 
own profit function, i.e. function of financial 
returns from a unit of investments.  
In the first stage of simulations, LU agents start 
with a given capital. The profit, which they earn 
during one simulation step, can be reinvested in 
the next step. Each time step LU agents may 
choose one out of the set of actions: 
o to maintain the same type of activity in 
the same parcel, 
o to change type of activity in the current 
cell, 
o to move to another cell and proceed with 
the same activity, 
o or to sell the parcel and leave land-use 
decision process in the next stage. 
The decisions of LU agents are based on the 
comparison of potential profit from one of the 
activities listed above. As described by Bell and 
Irwin [2002] the change of land use type will occur 
only if expected returns from converted cell minus 
costs of transition are greater than returns from the 
cell without change.  
taxes 









We incorporate a perception of risk of flooding 
as an innovative element in a model of land use 
behaviour. CZMP in the Netherlands assumes that 
different areas of coastal zone have different levels 
of safety depending on the economic value of the 
territory. The safety level of dunes and dykes 
along the coast ranges from the probability of 
flood of once in 1250 years to once in 10 000 
years. 
Besides this objective factor, we assume that 
individuals have their subjective perceptions of the 
situation. Individual perception of risk depends 
very much on the previous experience and 
communication about flood risk from the 
governmental authority as it was shown by 
Terpstra and Gutteling [2006]. Nowadays, the 
Dutch Governmental authorities initiate 
elaboration of insurance schemes against flood 
damage (see Rijkswaterstaat [2005]), which also 
have influence on the perception of risk. We will 
focus on these insurance frameworks in the 
sections about GA agent. 
Level of risk perception and its influence on the 
agent location behaviour may differ:  
a) people accept relatively high probability 
of flooding and buy insurance to protect 
their property against the risks in this 
area;  
b) people accept high probability and avoid 
much investment in building and 
infrastructure, instead investing in 
adaptive and flexible activity; 
c) people would rather invest in an area with 
low probability of flooding;  
d) or people are not aware of flood risk. 
Each LU agent has a certain level of risk 
perception, which influences their final decision 
about land use activity according to the following 
algorithm: 
1. LU agents calculate their expected profit 
from potential activities 
2. LU agents calculate expected damage 
form flood with a certain probability of 
occurrence 
3. According to the level of risk perception 
LU agents adjust their expected profit 
from each potential activity 
4. Following the scheme of insurance 
against flooding, which is proposed by 
GA agent, LU agents calculate their costs 
and benefits from the activity in a certain 
area 
5. While comparing all possible scenarios of 
their activities, LU agent choose the one, 
which maximises their profit under 
budget constrains. 
Following Grelot et al. [2005] a LU agents while 
choosing a location besides profit maximisation 
strategy might have mimetic or random behaviour. 
At the end of each time step, LU agents pay taxes 
to the budget of GA agent. 
3.2 “Governmental authority” Agent 
The aim of the GA agent is to maintain 
economic development on his territory. He is 
interested in attracting LU agents who make 
investments and pay taxes. To have LU agents on 
his territory GA agent should provide a certain 
safety level of the area and/or an attractive scheme 
of insurance against flooding. At the same time, it 
is important for GA agent to maintain economic 
development within the boundaries of spatial 
planning plans imposed by the Netherlands 
Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the 
Environment. GA agent provides policy 
regulations on the territory under his control and 
does not participate directly in the land use 
activity. 
The pressure on the available space increases in 
the Dutch coastal urban areas. Government has 
defined the so-called safety line. The territory 
behind this is considered legally protected. 
Contrary to buildings and infrastructure behind the 
flood defences, buildings on or in front of the 
flood defences have no legal protection level with 
respect to coastal erosion or flooding as it is shown 
Balfoort et al. [2002]. The local government is 
legally responsible for informing the public about 
the risks. However, in practice communication on 
this issue is not efficient. As a result there are 
unprotected areas of coastal towns where 
reconstruction of existing buildings and 
construction of new ones is possible. In case of the 
flood damage it is likely that the public will apply 
to the government for compensation.  
In order to find a solution for risk management 
of the area of coast under risk, four policy options 
were formulated in Rijkswaterstaat [2005]. These 
scenarios were taken as a basis for the behaviour 
of a GA agent in the simulation model. Thus, GA 
agent can propose one of the following options for 
flood insurance on his territory: 
A. LU agents take the risk on their own, GA 
agent continues the policy of maintaining 
the coastline with no additional 
construction; 
B. GA agent keeps the present safety levels 
and provides risk-aware construction, LU 
agents insure their property at a 
reasonable rate, which is defined by GA 
agent; 
C. GA agent takes responsibility for damage 
and may either offer inhabitants a certain 
level of insurance or may enforce 
building restrictions; LU agents partly 
take risk on their own; 
D. GA agent includes unprotected area 
within the chain of flood defences and 
guaranties the same level of protection as 
for legally protected area, extra flood 
defences are built, the property of LU 
agents is under insurance.  
Nowadays, insurance against flood in the 
Netherlands is under consideration and is not 
implemented yet.  
Summarizing, interactions between GA and LU 
agents during simulation include the 
communication of the following information: 
− GA agent has power to define safety lines, 
spatial planning policy and insurance 
schemes, 
− LU agents have a power to define the type of 
activity, type of behaviour, have perception of 
risk and decide whether to take risk of damage 
within the framework of conditions defined in 
the insurance policy. 
4. SPATIAL ENVIRONMENT 
Spatial environment proposed in the simulation 
model is part of the coastal zone area. Space is 
represented as a grid of cells. Each spatial cell is 
heterogeneous in terms of limitations applied by 
the morphological system (probability for land to 
be destroyed), coastal protection and spatial 
planning policy and economic conditions attached 
to the area, as well as natural conditions (soil type, 
etc.). In other words, the environment represents 
the boundary macro conditions in which agents 
act. Attributes of each cell in spatial grid make it 
available for a certain type of land use. 
Interpolation of these conditions defines the supply 
space for a certain land use type.  
Spatial environment of the ABM combines 
several features: 
o the information on flood/erosion risk 
(probability of risk),  
o CZMP map (including scheme of 
insurance from flooding), 
o administrative (tax, rent),  
o spatial planning maps 
These features serve as initial conditions for the 
decision making process of LU agents. 
Parameterisation of these factors gives the 
possibility to run scenarios for changing 
probability of natural hazard or spatial planning 
strategy.  
During the process of simulation both GA agent 
and LU agents exchange information with the 
spatial environment as presented in the Figure 1. 
LU agents observe the information about safety 
line position, spatial planning maps, etc., attached 
to each cell they are interested in. Outcome of the 
process of land use decision of LU agents (location 
choice) is recorded in particular cells/parcel of the 
spatial environment. At the end of each time step 
LU agents get the expected returns from each 
parcel. 
For each cell the GA agent gives the values of 
each of the features mentioned in the list above. As 
a feedback flow he receives data about location 
choices of the LU agents. Depending on the 
position of cells relatively to the safety line, GA 
agent can calculate what will be the damage for the 
territory under his authority in the case of flood. 
Interactions between agents and spatial 
environment provide spatially explicit simulation 
of land use decisions and emergence of patterns. 
5. CASE STUDY  
Case study area is the province of North 
Holland. Two coastal cities (Bergen aan Zee and 
Egmond aan Zee) are of great interest. There are 
several risk areas along the coast defined where a 
significant part of some coastal cities is located 
outside the safety line (see Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2: Safety lines for the town Bergen aan Zee, 
Netherlands 
The area, which is on or in front of the flood 
defences (marked as a black line here - Kernzone), 
has no legal protection level with respect to coastal 
erosion or flooding. Moreover, the position of this 
line is dynamic (point-line indicates the predicted 
future position – Beschermings zone) and is 
shifting landward. Thus, the questions are what is 
the appropriate way to reorganise this territory 
(negotiate for a higher safety level or to change 
land use configuration) and how will it influence 
spatial behaviour of land-users. 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS  
An agent-based model, which simulates the 
process of individual land use decision-making 
process in coastal zone, is proposed. The location 
of economic activities matters a lot because it 
provokes external effects from clustering and 
influences the risk of flooding. An important 
innovative aspect is that we incorporate perception 
of risk of flooding in the model of individual land 
user.  
The proposed ABM is elaborated to simulate 
land use decision process empirically grounded in 
the real world situation in the Netherlands. An 
iterated exchange between designed and empirical 
models helps to show the complex dynamics of 
economic system developing within the natural 
boundaries of CZA. The advantage of ABM 
approach is that it includes the human behaviour 
component in the model of land use change. Based 
on the decisions of spatially distributed individual 
economic agents operating in a framework of a 
certain coastal zone management policy, the model 
produces aggregated land-use patterns as an 
outcome. Understanding the factors that affect land 
use decisions will help policy makers design 
incentives to achieve policy objectives in coastal 
zone area. 
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